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A

CENTURY AGO, ADMIRAL CHARLES H. STOCKTON prepared a
U.S. Naval War Code which was approved by President McKinley in
June 1900 but was revoked four years later after certain concerns were
expressed by foreign governments. While it appears that the episode would
deserve a historical study evaluating the significance of this particular code
both for training Navy officers at the time and for later similar efforts, the more
general question of the role of individuals in international humanitarian law
appears worth being reflected upon in a study honoring Charles Stockton.
What is the role of individuals in international law? To what extent are
individuals bearers of international legal rights and obligations? What is their
role as actors in the progressive development of that law?
Not surprisingly, different answers to these complex questions have been
considered over time, and they remain rather controversial. As Karl Josef
Partsch concluded in 1985, it is difficult to formulate a thesis in this respect
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which both reflects a general consensus among writers and conforms with State
practice. He also expressed doubts whether the increased concern for the
protection of human rights during the last decades has led to a transformation
of the legal position of the individual.! Indeed, the central role of States as
sovereign subjects of international law has not changed very much throughout
this century. But political efforts to ensure protection of the individual and the
as well as governmental, international organizations
working to this end have gained considerable influence. It is significant that
practical aspects in the wider field of human rights and public opinion in many
quarters have increasingly challenged more traditional views of international
law as a whole, thus underlining the rights of individuals which all States must
respect and protect.
The aims of this study are to describe the role of the individual in the
ongoing evolution of international humanitarian law as a result of both factual
and policy developments, assess certain deficiencies of existing conventional
law, and develop various methodological considerations regarding
international
for military operations. Conclusions to be drawn
from these thoughts may affect the work of policy makers, legal practitioners,
and academic lawyers alike.

Evolution of International Humanitarian Law
Rights and obligations of individuals
their government have been
postulated since long before our present age. The specific question of whether
the Sovereign has an international obligation to observe the ordinary laws of
war even toward rebellious subjects who openly take up arms against him had
already surfaced by the eighteenth century.2 Individuals were not seen as
subjects of international law, a role that has been reserved for States since early
times. But characterizing human beings as pure objects of international law has
dichotomy
never been a convincing conclusion either. The
appears hardly appropriate in an area where legal protection of individuals is of
topical importance.3
The rapid factual development during the present century has added
additional arguments: national sovereignty is challenged today by the end of
the Cold War, failed processes of modernization, and
burdens
inherited from colonialism. There is, indeed, a need for global response to
existing security risks. Acts of terrorism, drug abuse, problems of migration,
and environmental protection require combined efforts which States today
cannot successfully perform except in cooperation with other States,
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international organizations, and even individuals. Challenged to deal with
security matters in a broader sense, States and societies are called upon to make
new efforts in order to overcome practical inabilities in the implementation of
shared principles. New ideas, attitudes, and resources have to be developed
jointly to ensure economic well,being and to meet environmental risks. The
challenges of our present information age require long,term attitudes based on
technological skills not always available within existing State establishments,
thus calling for increased cooperation between government agencies, private
companies, and individuals.
A distinct international interest on the part of national parliaments in a
growing number of democratic States today very significantly affects effort
taken on a global scale. Widely shared political concerns (in some States even
constitutional constraints) are relevant for parliamentary decision,making
regarding the use of military power. But there is also an increasing role for
human rights considerations, in calling for responsible action towards gross
violations in other States. National parliaments are increasingly involved in
international relations. They pass legislation regulating the sending of their
military forces abroad and the long,term or shorHerm stationing of foreign
forces on their own territory. Members of national parliaments participate in
international conferences and are important interlocutors for official visitors
from foreign States. Parliamentary debates are often used to articulate a
political interest in developments within other countries.
Human rights violations are typical fields of legitimate interference in
matters of general concern which today cannot be left to the domestic
jurisdiction of a particular State. State sovereignty at the end of this century is
no longer the same as it was at its beginning. These trends also reveal evolving
restraints in State immunity law, restraints which deserve thorough evaluation
from both national and international legal perspectives.
The present evolution of humanitarian law may be described as an evolution
of terms. The term armed conflict, which for a long time was not considered very
different from a war between States (whether formerly declared or factually
started), has now more or less evolved in meaning vis,a,vis its international
character. By far, most armed conflicts today are non, international. Very much
to be deplored, this development has not led to a decrease in cruelty on the
battlefield. The extent of suffering in non, international armed conflicts calls
for an international response. The term humanitarian protection has undergone
a similar development. It was first used to indicate protection granted by States,
on issues limited by strict adherence to the principle of non' interference in the
political affairs of other States. But there is hardly any objection today to
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application of this term in a broader sense, including the right to intervene for
humanitarian purposes against policy positions taken by other States. It also
encompasses the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
even individuals, to ensure and strengthen human rights protection. This
change inevitably leads to a new notion of international law, which is no longer
confined to the conduct of States in their mutual relationships but now extends
to individual human rights and to the global commitments of States not only to
respect but also to ensure respect for the protection of victims of human rights
violations.
In 1899 and 1907 the Hague Peace Conferences took decisive steps, first by
incorporating the obligation to issue instructions to the armed forces on the
laws and customs of war on land (Article 1 of Hague Convention IV), and later
by providing that a belligerent party which violates these regulations shall be
responsible for all acts committed by its armed forces and liable to pay
compensation (Article 3 of Hague Convention IV).
After World War I there were but weak attempts to develop individual
criminal responsibility under internationallaw.4 However, individual rights
were stressed and developed in various domains. The concept of the protection
of minorities, provided for in several peace treaties and special conventions
connected therewith, generated a new attitude of conflict management in
certain States which had either gained their independence or whose territory
was otherwise affected by the results of the war. Although the great powers
effectively rejected any effort to extend this protection to minorities in other
States, the underlying legal principles influenced the Declaration on the
International Rights of Man adopted by the Institut de Droit International in
1929.5 The concept of self-determination, developed by President Woodrow
Wilson, constituted the basis for the protection of non-self-governing
territories under the League of Nations mandate system. For the first time, the
protection of refugees under international law was implemented in a
multinational framework. Last, but not least, the Geneva Conventions of 1929
considerably improved the condition of the wounded and sick in armies in the
field, as well as the treatment of prisoners of war.
No effort was made at that time to enact individual responsibility of either
political or military leaders or those executing orders. But acts of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in World War II mobilized the
international community to take at least the first steps to close this gap. The
Genocide Convention of 1948 defined genocide as a crime under international
law and introduced an obligation to try or extradite persons charged with this
crime. It provides that competence rests with national tribunals of the State in
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the territory of which the act was committed, or "such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction" (Article VI). The obligation under the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 to punish or extradite persons who have
committed grave breaches of humanitarian law was similarly based on the idea
of national jurisdiction. The same applies to penal and disciplinary sanctions
under Article 28 of the Cultural Property Convention of 1954. Nevertheless,
these instruments effectively introduced the principle of individual
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity into conventional
law, thus confirming the conclusion of the Nuremberg Tribunal that" [c]rimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced."6
While the idea of indi'\jdual responsibility under international law has
developed considerably during this century, there is still a reluctance to accept
corresponding rights of the individual, rights based on international legal rules
and given teeth by specific remedies against one's own, as well as foreign,
States. Current State practice normally limits legal remedies to strict rules
under existing nationanaw. Arguments based on international law are hardly.
of importance to national jurisdiction. Where the question of remedies for
violation of rights based on international law is raised, it is as a matter of
principle not for the individual owner of such rights to take effective action, but
rather the State of which he or she is a national.
.
The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 was one of the first international
instruments to establish an individual right corresponding to the idea of
individual responsibility. According to its Article 109, paragraph 3, no sick or
injured prisoner of war may be repatriated against his will during hostilities.
This right was further developed by the evolving practice of ensuring each
prisoner of war the right to refuse repatriation at the end of an armed conflict, if
he so chooses, and the right to have a private interview with an ICRC
(International Committee of the Red Cross) official to confirm that his
decision was made freely and without coercion.
The 1977 Additional Protocols did not further develop those individual
rights, except to provide fundamental legal guarantees to be granted within the
relevant national system (Article 75 of Protocol I) and a right to refuse surgical
operation (Article 11). In human rights conventions, however, a decisive step
was taken to strengthen the rights of individual persons. The 1966 Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
that a State may recognize the competence of the Committee of Human Rights
to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its
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jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State of any of the
rights enumerated in the Covenant, provided they have exhausted all available
domestic remedies. likewise, the 1984 Torture Convention introduced the
option for a State to accept the competence of the International Committee
against Torture to investigate complaints by individuals falling under the
jurisdiction of that particular State.
Even in the absence of legal remedies, individuals may claim collective
as confirmed in Article 1 (2) of the
rights, e.g., the right of
UN Charter and common Article 1 (1) of the 1966 Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. There is some
sense, therefore, in assuming that respect for this right is an erga omnes
obligation binding all States and owed to the international community as a
cannot be limited to the peoples of
whole. The right of
existing States; otherwise, there would be no
beyond a
closed and often very arbitrary system which in itself provides the basis for
demands for change. There is, however, no consensus on the present legal
The liquidation of
prerequisites for claiming a right of
former European colonial regimes might be least controversial today. The
United Nations has outlawed colonialism, and all relevant decisions can be
effectively based on Chapters XI-XIII of the UN Charter. The right of
may also be used to support efforts to restore sovereignty in
territories where it has been illegally denied in recent times. In situations,
however, which are characterized by neither colonialism nor illegal
remains highly
occupation, any recourse to the right of
States. An
controversial. There is no right of separation from
exception to this rule may be the fact that serious human rights violations
could generate a right of separation as a last resort.7 Consensus on this issue will
remain difficult to achieve. It is no surprise that acceptance of the right of
in the international community tends to increase
proportionally with the distance from actual events.
Within the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSeE)
process, the significance of the human dimension was stressed by the third
basket of the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975, and more specifically during
the meetings held in 1989 (Vienna), 1990 (Copenhagen), and 1991 (Cracow,
Geneva, and Moscow). It remains to be seen, however, whether this process
may lead to the creation of new individual rights which go beyond a
strengthening of existing commitments under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. The International Helsinki
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Federation, in its 1997 Report, stated that human rights violations had been,
and were still being, committed in thirty' two of the fifty,four oseE member
States; yet, there is no effective international mechanism to examine such
allegations or to ensure that appropriate remedies are available in the interest
of the victims.
In accordance with the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, any citizen of the European Union has a right to see the law
determining his or her position respected by Community institutions, as well as
member States.8 This right, and the corresponding remedies under European
Union law, is comparable to national legal guarantees granted by a State to its
citizens. Such guarantees cannot be expected to become part of global
international law in the foreseeable future.
In a recent systematic study of the rights and obligations of individuals as
subjects of international humanitarian law, George Aldrich has assessed the
existing individual criminal responsibility under international law for war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against peace, in the framework of possible
individual rights corresponding to individual obligations.9 He very
convincingly stresses that the latter are much less developed than the former.
In this context, he has coined the term "imperfect right" to describe a situation
where (1) legal rights of an individual have been violated, (2) the individual
perpetrator is subject to criminal punishment as a result, and (3) the
perpetrator, as well as his State, may at least theoretically be liable for damages.
While individual remedies are available only in exceptional cases, individual
claims remain widely dependent upon protection by the State concerned, and
the latter is alone authorized to put such claims forward, or even waive them at
the expense of those whose rights have been violated.
The extent to which attempts to solve this situation are realistic is
debatable. International cooperation is regularly developed without the
benefits oflaw courts, without sanctions protecting the owner of specific rights
against violations, and without a full,fledged system of reparations. Disputes
can very often be settled only through negotiations on the basis of formal
equality, without recourse to higher authorities. Where reparations can be
achieved, they often tend to remain rather symbolic.
Yet the role of legal arguments in such cooperation should not be
underestimated. Legal positions are of importance, irrespective of the
opportunity for enforcing their implementation. Even symbolic acts of
reparation may have relevance for the participants as part of psychological or
historical Vergangenheitsbewiiltigung. The dissuasive role oflegal reasoning may
125

Role of Individuals
add to the significance of such activities in avoiding possible claims as much as
in settling existing ones.
The evolution oflaw is a complex process, influenced by many players and
dependent on various different sources. This is particularly true for
international law, with all its imperfections. Efforts to overcome deficiencies in
this area require patience and a good sense of proportion. It is in this spirit that
existing gaps in existing international law ought to be assessed.
Deficiencies of Existing Conventional Law
At the present stage oflegal development, it is no longer possible, as a matter
of positive law, to regard States as the only subjects of international law. 1o
However, there are a number of deficiencies which make it difficult for
individuals either to exercise rights not deriving from their national legal
system against their own State or to exercise rights against foreign States
without the support of their own government acting on their behalf.
The most important deficiency of international humanitarian law as laid
down in existing conventions and agreements is its limited scope of
applicability. Designed for armed conflicts of an international character, most
of these rules do not formally apply to
armed conflicts. In an
effort to secure minimum rules in such conflicts, common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II have underlined the
legal difference between international and
armed conflicts
in a rather rudimentary way. If these provisions were understood as limiting
conflicts to an enumerative set of
legal protection in
minimum rules, they would have to be considered as counterproductive in the
interest of individual victims. Such a perception would be in strong
contradiction to undeniable requirements of reality on the battlefield and
would run counter to widely accepted principles of the rule of law. An
excessively restrictive observance of the difference between international and
armed conflicts in State practice would evidence a
mentality unlikely to find any support in public opinion. There are but few
armed forces, however, which have formally abolished such double standards
by following an official policy of compliance with the full body of rules of
international humanitarian law during
conflicts.u
Corresponding recommendations developed at the international level have
not been implemented as widely as one would wishY The fact that such a
policy serves not only humanitarian interests but also operational requirements
has been stressed by expertsj13 nonetheless, widespread ignorance ofit remains.
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Yet concrete results have never been fully investigated by legal and
operational experts. The degree to which rules of international armed conflict
are tailored to police,type operations in different levels of crisis during
non,international conflicts may also be a matter of dispute. The use of the
shotgun and tear gas, which must be seriously questioned during armed
conflicts, was never prohibited for police operations, although the three
general principles underlying the law of armed conflict are fully relevant to
police operations: that the use of force is permissible only if it is directed against
legitimate targets, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering, and perfidious
acts are unlawful. The relevance of armed conflict law for military operations
other than war needs to be studied in further detail. While interdisciplinary
efforts to this effect would seem appropriate, and though the role of operational
experts cannot be underestimated, it should not be overlooked that legal and
policy considerations will often be decisive when balanced against factual and
operational considerations.
A further deficiency of international humanitarian law remains the large
number of breaches of its existing rules. The problem is not unique to this field
of law; it also applies to certain parts of national law, such as traffic law,
taxation, customs, or environmental provisions. Though it would appear
inappropriate to draw comparisons between these very different areas of legal
regulation, one possible common conclusion may be that frequent violations
do not necessarily amount to complete disregard of the law. Nevertheless, the
need to further develop sanctions and foster dissemination of particular rules
must be underlined.
Objective fact,finding, so essential for effective law enforcement, is difficult
to achieve. The Commission established under Article 90 of the 1977 Protocol
I Additional to the Geneva Conventions to investigate allegations of serious
violations of the Conventions and of the Protocol has not yet been given a
single chance to provide its services. This is the case even though a growing
number of States have recognized its competence and despite the fact that it is
designed to work without publicity so as to avoid publicly offending States and
to facilitate diplomatic solutions. There is no effective international
jurisdiction at a global scale for adjudicating claims for violations of
humanitarian law. The national jurisdiction of the author State is in many
cases not sufficient. As far as the national jurisdiction of third States is
concerned, the act of State doctrine still provides for sovereign immunity of the
author State for acta iure imperii, with no exception for serious human rights
violations.
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Given this situation, the issue of whether claims brought before the courts of
the author State may be based on national or international law is less relevant.
It may be noted, however, that the German Federal Constitutional Court has
held that no general rule of international law excludes individual claims for
acts or omissions of a foreign State committed during a war. 14 The Court saw, in
principle, parallel remedies for individuals and States, but it also underlined the
fact that individual claims may be expressly excluded by peace treaties and
similar treaties, such as the London Agreement on German External Debts of
February 27, 1953. 15
Rights of the individual are decisively expressed by the manner and extent
to which claims may be pursued; legal remedies to receive reparation (in terms
of restitution or compensation) are still very imperfect. Full reparation can
hardly be achieved in cases involving violations of humanitarian law. In this
respect, pecuniary harm should not obscure the importance of reparation for
emotional and moral damage. Legal restitution in terms of criminal sanctions
had important psychological reparation effects for raped women in the former
Yugoslavia, even where financial payments were impossible or unrealistic. The
work of the Truth Commission in South Africa, which leads to a lump sum
payment of no more than two thousand Rand (U.S. $400) to each of
thousand victims of the apartheid regime, irrespective of the
amount and degree of suffering, nevertheless has had the effect of restoring
individual confidence in the rule oflaw in situations were adequate payment of
damages is impossible or not expected.
These few examples may suffice to support the thesis that no system of
individual claims could be considered sufficient for systematic and massive
violations of legal principles and rules. Even States trying in the most diligent
manner to arrange for reparations have failed to cope with the extent of cruelty
of which humankind is capable.
The imperfect state of international humanitarian law implementation
reflects a situation common to many areas of international law, one that may be
best influenced by personal activities within governments,
organizations, and by the public. 16 This deficiency also offers opportunities for
an active role by the individual, given that all implementation work depends
on human activities at various levels of the State and on the willingness and
organizations and
ability of State officials to cooperate with
private citizens.
The role of individuals may also be affected by challenges to the law of
neutrality during the present period of rapid development in the law. Both the
Hague Peace Conferences prior to World War I and the development of the
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Geneva Conventions are important examples of the role of neutral States in
supporting the implementation and further development of humanitarian
rules. The responsibility of neutral States to develop the law protecting
individuals in the future is also evident. I?
In failing States-which remain subjects of international law but, due to
their lack of capacity to act, are exempt from responsibility under international
law-even fundamental individual rights are unprotected. Failing States are
characterized by total dissolution of order as a consequence of internal
development and the absence of an effective negotiating partner
the
international community. Although direct criminal responsibility of
individuals exists, and criminal jurisdiction can be exercised by third States and
competent international tribunals, individual claims would appear unrealistic
under such conditions. ls
Considerations for International Law,Making
It is particularly difficult to assess possibilities for
in areas relating to military operations. States tend to stress the ad hoc
significance of such operations. Even in cases in which military forces are
operating in implementation of Security Council resolutions, it is not beyond
dispute which body of law-that of armed conflict or law of peacetime
operations-is properly applicable. This might explain the reluctance to
acknowledge a need to develop further the rules, especially in a systematic
manner. Furthermore, there are both general and specific obstacles to
developing new conventional law in this area. Opinio iuris, a prerequisite for
law creation (not only in the context of customary law), is only slowly, and
often rather vaguely, shaped by public opinion and State practice.
A cautious attitude towards conventional law creation is also suggested by
recent developments. The most important example remains the experience
with the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions. It took
considerable time, despite the presence of the ICRC as an effective and
professional promoter of that law, to establish the consensus necessary to reach
the stage of signature in 1977, and even more so to carry the effort through to
ratification (now in more than 140 States). In each case, ratification was based
on national decisions, formally closed to international coordination-although
nevertheless subject to a certain extent to outside influences.
The lesson which may be gleaned from the 1980 Convention on Certain
of the
Conventional Weapons is not very different. Developed as a
negotiations on the 1977 Protocols, the 1980 Convention was at first limited to
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a prohibition of particular means and methods of combat that were of no
distinct operational importance. 19 The number of States parties to this
Convention remained considerably low until the First Review Conference in
1995 when the new Protocol N on Blinding Laser Weapons of October 13,
1995, was added, a remarkable, although limited, step towards new
conventional rules. The revision of Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby,Traps, and Other Devices on May 3, 1996, was an
even more important second step, one supported by the international
campaign against land mines. In this respect, the concerted efforts of many
energetic players and the overwhelming evidence of excessive civilian
casualties in more than a hundred States mobilized public opinion and soon led
a considerable
of governments to change their position as to the
desirability and extent of a prohibition. At the same time, this exceptional
campaign illustrated that the creation of conventional law is uncertain even in
the face of overwhelming public expectations. Successful efforts to prohibit
certain uses of anti,personnel land mines have not been accompanied in all
quarters by equally effective efforts toward a prohibition of production,
stockpiling, and sale. Thus, the new Convention on the Prohibition of
Landmines, which was opened for signature in Ottawa on December 3, 1997,
did not gain the same initial support as the revised Protocol II in 1996.
Furthermore, individual rights have not been stipulated in this context; the
issue, however, may well be taken up later.
Political commitments and a policy of "soft law" implementation in some
States may facilitate such trends. But they cannot substitute for a solid and
often cumbersome process of creating conventional legal rules based on
reciprocity, careful implementation of existing law, and the exercise of
sanctions against breaches.
The relevant UN policy is still uncertain in many respects. While individual
human rights were first addressed in the Charter and international instruments
developed under the auspices of the World Organization, many solutions have
remained rather erratic. New legal provisions remain subject to the political
will of governments. Proposals developed within the United Nations
Secretariat have to cope with this reality. Yet the responsibility of, and
opportunities for, the UN to influence legal perceptions by offering relevant
information and developing appropriate proposals should not be
underestimated; they should be given full support by the member States.
An important example in this respect is the 1994 Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel. Efforts to prepare this new
convention did not go as far as consolidating and codifying international rules
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suggested by the Secretary-GeneraFo The Convention contains a few articles
on certain fundamental obligp.tions of States, balanced by provisions on the
relevant obligations of such personnel. The solution found is not free from gaps
and uncertainties. It is based on a considerable misunderstanding that Article
2(2) of the Convention excludes UN operations authorized by the Security
Council as enforcement actions under Chapter VII "in which any of the
personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to
which the law of international armed conflict applies." Enforcement actions
under Chapter VII should never be, and hence never be misinterpreted as,
armed conflicts between the military forces involved. Rather, UN forces must
be respected as enjoying immunity under Article 105 of the Charter and the
general terms of the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations. Their members may not be taken as prisoners of war; in the
event they are detained, it would be absurd to suggest they should not be
released before "the cessation of active hostilities" in accordance with Article
118(1) of the Third Geneva Convention, the accepted rule for combatants in
armed conflicts. Thus, the 1994 Convention does not meet important
requirements of peace enforcement which led to its development. 21
More successful, though considerably more controversial and time
consuming, were efforts to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC).
After several decades of discussion in various fora, this idea is now supported by
the global consensus on the urgent need to establish the ad hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. A conference of States will be
convened in 1998 to prepare the legal basis of the ICC in more concrete terms
than ever before. The competence of the ICC will be limited to acts of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and wars of aggression. Its
jurisdiction will be subsidiary; only cases that cannot be adjudicated by
national courts because they are unable or unwilling to restore justice shall be
brought to the International Tribunal. In this context, the extent to which a
State Party to the planned ICC Statute may have to modify its national laws
(e.g., concerning extradition of nationals) remains to be clarifiedY
Jurisdiction over command responsibility issues will remain a complex
subjectP Major efforts will be required to introduce rules of procedure that
are not included in the statute, subject to further experience of the ICC. In
this respect, the development ofinternational rules of evidence will be of key
importance.24
Once established, the permanent International Criminal Tribunal will be a
great step forward to ensuring the rule of law as a prerequisite for internal
security, social stability, and peaceful development. It will support justice
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where national judicial organs are failing. To build confidence on the part of
the victims, to ensure legal balance, and avoid creating perceptions of victors'
justice, a permanent international court is preferable to any ad hoc tribunal.
The relationship between national and international jurisdiction should,
however, be assessed in greater detail. Under what constraints should a State
extradite its own nationals? Moreover, when should it extradite its own
military personnel, who are subject to particular national order and discipline,
and accountable to the highest political leadership? Are there limits to the ne
bis in idem rule in cases where a national court has issued a sentence that at the
international level might be considered too mild in comparison? How should
cooperation between international and national judicial organs be developed?
A thorough reassessment also appears to be necessary on the issue of
individual claims. The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, adopted in
1996, did not mention the individual as a bearer of rights and obligations at
all.25 Its Article 40 offers a very broad definition of the injured State, including
even infringements of rights arising from a multilateral treaty or rules of
customary international law in third States, anywhere on the globe, if it is
established that "the right has been created or is established for the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Thus, human rights violations in
any part of the world would allow any State to consider itself as injured and
entitled under Article 42 of the draft "to obtain from the State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act full reparation in the form of
restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction and assurances and guarantees
either singly or in combination." Hardly any State, however,
of
will defend claims of citizens of third States. If the individual victim himself
could put claims forward against the author State and base his claim on
international law rather than the national law of that State, reparations might
be more effective.
An excellent example of an expert proposal compiled in international
cooperation to support lawmaking by States is the revised set of Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law prepared by Theo van
Boven as Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Z6 It
starts from the principle that every State has the duty to respect, and to ensure
respect for, human rights and humanitarian law. This obligation includes the
duty to prevent violations, investigate violations, take appropriate action
against violators, and afford remedies and reparation to victims. As stipulated
by the Special Rapporteur, every State shall ensure that adequate legal or other
appropriate remedies are available to any person claiming that his or her rights
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have been violated. Reparation may be claimed by the direct victims or their
immediate family. It includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
Restitution, which is designed
satisfaction, and guarantees of
to reestablish the situation that existed prior to the violations, shall include
restoration ofliberty, family life, citizenship, return to one's place of residence,
and use of property. Compensation shall be provided for any pecuniarily
assessable damage resulting from violations of human rights and humanitarian
law, such as physical or mental harm, (including pain, suffering, and emotional
distress) and lost opportunities (including education, material damages, and
loss of earnings-including in turn loss of earning potential, harm to reputation
or dignity, and costs required for legal or expert assistance). Rehabilitation
shall be provided, and it will include medical and psychological care as well as
legal and social services. Satisfaction and guarantees of
shall be
provided, including, as necessary, cessation of continuing violations,
verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth; an official
declaration or a judicial deciSion restoring the dignity, reputation, and legal
rights of the persons connected with the victim; an apology, including public
acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility; judicial or
administrative sanctions against persons responsible for the violations;
commemorations and tributes to the victims; inclusion in human rights
training and in history textbooks of an accurate account of the violations
committed in the field of human rights and humanitarian law; and preventing
the recurrence of violations-by such means as ensuring effective civilian
control of military and security forces, restricting the jurisdiction of military
tribunals to only specifically military offenses committed by members of the
armed forces, strengthening the independence of the judiciary, protecting the
legal profeSSion and human rights defenders, and improving, on a priority basis,
human rights training for all sectors of society, in particular for military and
security forces, as well as for law enforcement officials.
Acceptance of these draft principles and guidelines would progressively
develop existing international law, which is still very far from providing full
reparations in favor of individuals. In most situations, the right to reparation
still rests \vithin municipal legal orders; there are no other means of
enforcement except under national law.
International judicial mechanisms developed under the European and the
American Conventions on Human Rights will hardly gain more than regional
importance in this respect, although the interlinked mechanism of the
European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, which
allows for a certain degree of individual complaint against infringements of
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fundamental freedoms, has been recommended as a model for other areas. 27 Of
practical significance could be the relevant UN procedures in fora such as the
United Nations Claims Commission (UNCC). In this respect, however, more
experience still has to be collected. In addition to the fact that practice remains
to be developed in administering funds on behalf of UN organs, State practice
remains decisive for legal development. This practice will be influenced, but
not exclusively governed, by general principles as shaped in legal writings over
the centuries.28 There is still no comprehensive concept of reparations in cases
of breach of humanitarian law. Practical solutions remain rudimentary, and it
must be admitted that full reparation can hardly be expected in any case, even
those involving grave breaches of the law.
Considering the issue in more general terms, and maybe in a longer time
frame, however, allows for an overall picture in which legal principles are of clear
relevance. The Martens clause, shaped into conventional law at the First Hague
Peace Conference in 1899 and reaffirmed in the 1977 Additional Protocols to
the Geneva Conventions, has been used to close legal lacunae and develop
appropriate principles and rules in cases not covered by existing conventional
law. Its reference to established custom, the principles of humanity, and the
dictates of public conscience has provided arguments that have been seen as
describing underlying principles for legal provisions and rules of conduct for
States and international organizations. The relevance of these provisions and
rules for legal and policy decisions has never been seriously disputed. The role of
the media and its influence for international decision making has been very often
enhanced by principles and attitudes which enjoy support in various quarters,
even among people who disagree on many daily political issues. Backed by
professional international institutions such as the ICRC, by relevant NGOs, and
by academia, such principles are part of the process oflaw creation today, even in
areas where there were different, or even no, rules at an earlier stage. This may
lead to an application onegal rules developed for other purposes, in cases that
had previously been considered quite different.
Lawmaking by analogy is not a new idea. Lawyers tend to draw arguments
from comparable situations, cases, and legal regulations. Vattel was convinced
that the rules of the natural law of nations can be derived by analogy from the
natural law of manj29 the opposite was, however, never common consensus.
Rules of the law of nations have only limited influence on internal law. The
differences in the responsibilities and interests involved are too great.
Individuals can hardly compare their interests with group interests. It would be
inappropriate to compare individuals with Statesj it may even remain an open
question whether or not it is in the best interest of the individual to develop
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rights (and duties) under international law independently from rights and
duties of his or her home State. Yet individuals need protection against States,
a requirement which is not limited to the relationship with their own State.
This is so because today considerable ties, expanding in quantity and quality,
exist between States and nationals of other States, requiring both sides to
observe rules towards each other and making it necessary for individuals to
claim rights on their own behalf without recourse to support from their home
State. There is an evolving custom and indeed a developing legal opinio to
prove the existence of such rights.30
This process has also affected the role of the individual in the development
oflaw, its possible influence on decision making, and the interpretation of rules
and their implementation. There are but rare exceptions to the principle that
rules of international law are created by States and not by private individuals.
But it should be remembered that States act through individual men and
women as their representatives. These representatives are not only bound by
instructions in performing their particular mission, but they very often actively
develop positions that are approved by their superiors, even accepted without
further deliberation. As are all individuals, government experts are subject to
outside influences in a complex personal process of decision making. This is
well accepted even by traditional law. The sources of international law
enumerated in Article 38, paragraph 1 (a-c), of the Statute of the International
Court of} ustice reveal a certain role of the individual in the lawmaking process.
Treaties and contracts may be concluded between States or international
organizations and foreign private law persons. Customary law and general
principles oflaw are based on man,made arguments, subject to confirmation by
State practice. As subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
international law, Article 38, paragraph l(d), expressly refers not only to
judicial decisions but also to "the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations." The present information age may lead to a
considerable increase in the influence of a large number of such persons. At the
same time, the transparency of available information may also support
mainstream trends in arguments and consideration of relevant State practice.
Thus this development often contributes to practice,oriented, and less
extravagant, results.
Conclusions
Even if the present assessment remains incomplete in various respects and is
subject to further developments, there can be no doubt of the fact that
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individuals clearly have an active role to playas bearers of individual rights and
obligations under international humanitarian law, or that individuals acting for
States, international organizations, or even on their own enjoy considerable
opportunity to participate in the development of that law.
The many factors of human decision making require an interdisciplinary
approach, one which includes ethical, cultural, technological, economic, and
operational considerations. A complete assessment must be based on an array
of different aspects. There is no guarantee, however, that objective criteria will
be observed. Rather, the importance of policy constraints suggests that the
degree to which particular aspects will be taken into due consideration and
weighed against other aspects and requirements is undergoing rapid
development. The role of legal advisors in this complex process of decision
making is a delicate one. Weighing different interests exposes him or her to
blame for Wishful thinking; sticking to the more technical task of interpreting
existing rules and provisions would offer less than might be rightly expected.
Lawyers should stress the importance of policy constraints on military
operations. It is their task to balance the rights and obligations of the operators
in the field to ensure that they are fully informed about the relevant legal
framework and that they fully use existing opportunities. This advisory task,
however, has to be performed with a sense of proportion as regards the methods
to be applied and the objective to be sought. It would be wrong to see the legal
advisor solely in the role of post factum defender of the operator. Rather, he has
to involve himself in the decision,making process, influence target selection,
accept full responsibility for his advice, and develop the courage to dissuade
others from excessive plans.
As Rosalyn Higgins has suggested, international law is a process of
authoritative decision making, not just the neutral application of rules.31 This
is especially true for rules of armed conflict law, which are based on policy
considerations derived from the principle of distinction between civilian
objects and military objectives, the avoidance of unnecessary suffering or
superfluous injury, and the prohibition of acts of perfidy. The whole body of
humanitarian law in armed conflicts is to be understood as a process of
respecting and implementing these few principles. It is not a fixed set of bright
line rules which can be applied irrespective of the factual context. To use
Rosalyn Higgins's words, none of the problems explored can be satisfactorily
resolved by confident invocation of a "correct rule."
It is interesting to speculate how Admiral Stockton would have reacted to
some of the modem challenges described in this contribution. He would
probably have developed arguments and positions different from those he
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chose in his time. But he would surely have done so with an attitude very
similar to that for which he was well known by his contemporaries. Practical
assessments, professionalism, and legal passion might have led him to personal
initiatives in support of both national interests and the protection of the rights
of individuals.
It should be stressed that none of the many issues to be raised in this context
can be solved without international cooperation. The existence of
international rights and obligations depends on acceptance by more than one
State. It is therefore not enough to draw on a particular national legal system.
Rather, it is the international environment of individual action that also
influences the legal assessment in a given context.
Results in this continuing process will remain as incomplete and imperfect as
nearly everything else in legal development. It remains difficult to make
effects often remain
convincing assessments except in retrospect.
obscure, and anticipating objections which may arise at a later stage is risky by
any standard. Thus developing humanitarian law remains as much a challenge
for individual actors as for States and organizations authorizing, sponsoring, or
supporting this task.
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